By Zia Sarhadi

Twenty years after the Soviet invasion in December 1979, and more than 10 years after the Red Army's defeat, the people of Afghanistan appear no closer to peace. War seems to be a permanent feature of life. Numerous theories have been advanced to explain the reasons for their plight. All are coloured by the commentators' preferences and perceptions. Some blame the Americans for Afghanistan's continuing disaster; others suggest that the tribal nature of Afghan society is the root cause; yet others opine that, had it not been for outside interference, the Afghans would have been able to come to some sort of understanding among themselves.

There is some truth in each assertion but there is also a need to examine the Afghan situation more broadly. The anti-American argument has great merit, but must be viewed in light of whether the Afghans or their Pakistani supporters should have accepted American help at all in their fight against the Soviets. Today, many Muslims ask why the Americans and the west are doing nothing to save Chechenya from obliteration. The same accusation would have been levelled had the US remained aloof from the Afghans' anti-Soviet struggle.

Where Muslims falter is in their understanding of the nature of the west, especially the US. American "help" is never cost-free. They "helped' not because they cared for freedom, loved the Afghans for their bravery, or liked Afghanistan for its geography or its high mountain peaks; for the Americans, it was cold-blooded calculation: they wanted to maximize the instability in the region caused by the Soviet invasion, and to use the opportunity to establish a foothold in the region. They may also have wanted to exact revenge from the Soviets for Vietnam. Washington was prepared to fight to the last Afghan to achieve their objectives. But once they were realized, the Americans were not prepared to let the Afghans or their Muslim backers get away with anything else. The murder - and it was nothing less than that - of general Zia-ul Haq in August 1988 was almost certainly American-engineered. The general had served his purpose and had to be removed. Along with him went the top echelon of Pakistan's military brass.

The tribal nature of Afghan society and outside interference are inter-related. Outsiders are able to interfere only when there are differences among the Afghans themselves. Unfortunately, 10 years of jihad were not enough to eradicate the Afghanis' tribalism. The ill-effects of tribal warfare have spilled over into Pakistan as well. During the war against the Soviets, an estimated three million Afghan refugees poured into Pakistan; at least half of them are still there. With the emergence of the Taliban, a new, more insidious form of threat is posed to Pakistani society.

It is not widely known that throughout the Soviet occupation, the residents of Kabul were unaffected by the war. The Soviets concentrated their savage bombardment on villages and towns in the outer provinces, where the mujahideen had their support. In fact, Kabul is a city unlike any other in Afghanistan. Even before the secularising impact of the Russian invasion, western influence there was widespread. It was common to see girls and women in jeans or skirts, in sharp contrast to the burqas that are the norm elsewhere in the country. There was also much immorality in the city.

With the arrival of the Taliban in Kabul, these people fled to Pakistan. Their presence had a troubling effect on the Pakistani society, especially in Peshawar and Islamabad. A number of bawdy houses have sprung up in well-to-do localities, frequented by politicians, bureaucrats, landlords, industrialists and their sons. All-night dance parties where drinks flow freely - and a great deal more beside - are now common. The immoral hordes from Kabul did not dare enter these cities while the mujahideen were present. Whatever else one may say of them, the mujahideen were at least morally upright and did not tolerate such lewdness among the Afghan population. When they left, morality went with them.

Pakistani policy-makers have paid little or no attention to the social costs of this intrusion on their society. In fact, it appears to be encouraged, since some officials are among the worst offenders. This also reflects the schizophrenic mentality and warped priorities in Pakistan. If the offenders had been ordinary people, there would be much uproar; for the rich and powerful, everything is permissible in the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan."

The social impact of this policy has not been properly assessed. The political dimension of the continuing war in Afghanistan also needs analysing. Since Pakistan was immediately and greatly affected by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Islamabad was bound to react to the increased threat on its western border, when the threat from India on its eastern border has been a permanent feature of life. Pakistan's geography and the mindset that pervades the higher echelons of the civil-military bureaucracy were bound to seek closer accommodation with Washington, even if it meant entering into numerous compromises.

This is precisely what happened. What the Pakistani rulers failed to take account of was Washington's unreliability as an ally. As the former British prime minister Lord Palmerston famously said: "His Majesty's Government has no permanent friends, only permanent interests." America is even more notorious for ditching "allies" and "friends." The graveyard is full of its trusted allies: the Shah of Iran, Marcos of the Philippines and a host of other dictators kicking themselves in their graves at how they were fooled by their American "friends'. But it would be naive to believe that Washington ever considered Pakistan an ally. There is no compatibility between the two; beggars and givers can never have an equal relationship, a point the ruling Úlites in Pakistan have always ignored. Self-deception is a peculiar characteristic of the continental crowd, especially those residing on the western banks of the great rivers. They have to pay the price for such faulty thinking.

Pakistani policy-makers pat themselves on the back for achieving the impossible: defeating the Red Army in Afghanistan; and creating a buffer space against its arch-rival India. This is based on the assumption that the Afghans can be relied upon. There is a growing feeling among some in Pakistan that ( harsh as it may sound ( there appears to be something peculiar about the Afghan mind which fails to show gratitude even to long-time friends. Did Islamabad not take care of the numerous mujahideen leaders and their families for more than two decades? What kind of gratitude did they show?

But more important than Islamabad's policy is the question of outside interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. The arch-villain continues to be Uncle Sam, who used and abused the Afghans, and then abandoned them with indecent haste, leaving behind many unresolved problems. It would be naive to expect the Americans to behave differently or to solve the problems of Afghanistan or Pakistan; their purpose is the opposite. Once the Soviets left Afghanistan, the US turned on both the Afghans and Pakistan with a vengeance. Yesterday's "freedom fighters' became today's "terrorists.'

Another legacy bequeathed by the Americans to Pakistan is the culture of drug-taking. US drug-enforcement agents have invaded Pakistan like locusts and prowl its airports to ensure that drug traffickers are prevented from smuggling their lethal consignments to Europe or America. The result has been an alarming increase in drug addiction in Pakistan. In 1980, there was not a single heroin-addict in Pakistan; today there are more than 6 million.

As the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 27, 1979) is commemorated, the problems created by their legacy need to be remembered, and serious questions addressed.

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