Arafat’s stubbornness owes more to fear than principle, as leaked document reveals depth of betrayal

By Khalil Osman

The Palestinian track of the Middle East "peace process" is continuing its downward spiral into confusion, which accelerated with the collapse of the US-hosted Camp David summit between Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian National Authority (PNA) chairman Yasser Arafat in July. Both sides remain apart on key issues at the heart of the decades-long conflict. The employment of pressure tactics and contradictory political messages by both sides reached new heights on September 19, when Israel announced the suspension of talks with Palestinian negotiators, only to resume negotiations within twenty-four hours.

The deadlock highlights the internal contradictions in the "peace process," which sought to construct delusions of progress by reaching a series of agreements on minor issues and deferring to the future the day of reckoning when fundamental and thorny issues must be tackled. Although the two sides have been in contact since the collapse of the Camp David summit, there have been no formal top-level negotiations and they have already missed a self-imposed September 13 deadline for a ‘final status agreement’. This indicates that no quick breakthrough is imminent, as in the past breakthroughs have come only as a result of top-level talks.

The talks are primarily deadlocked over control of the holy sites in Jerusalem. Other key issues, including the return of Palestinian refugees, the status of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Ghazzah Strip, the borders of a future Palestinian state, and control over water resources, also remain to be resolved. Israeli and American officials have tried to blame the deadlock on Arafat, repeatedly calling on the PNA chairman to show "flexibility." Since the inconclusive summit at Camp David, Arafat has appeared firm against US and Israeli pressure by accepting shared sovereignty over the al-Haram al-Sharif (Holy Sanctuary) compound in East Jerusalem (known to Israelis as Temple Mount), which Israel occupied in the June 1967 war.

Arafat’s refusal to budge on sovereignty over the holy sites owes more to fear of the wrath of Muslims the world over, than to genuine tenacity and steadfastness. In an interview with The Washington Post (September 13, 2000), Musa Abu Karsh, Ghazzah bureau chief for the official Palestinian newspaper al-Hayat al-Jadidah referred obliquely to Arafat’s predicament, saying: "Arafat has no more space for compromises." He added candidly: "We would attack Arafat if he compromises on any of these three subjects: Jerusalem, the right of return for refugees and Palestinian statehood. Anyone who makes concessions on such issues deserves to be killed as a traitor."

Arafat’s stance on Jerusalem is despite the fact that he has never previously missed an opportunity to compromise in order to reach an agreement. In a meeting held on September 20 with Abraham Fox, director of the Anti-Defamation League, an American Jewish group, Arafat expressed his willingness to trade land with Israel to allow the Jewish state to keep some of its settlements in the West Bank; he also proposed to deal with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon before those in other countries, and revealed that an understanding was reached whereby an international force would be deployed in the Jordan valley. In New York, Nasser al-Qudwah, PNA representative at the UN, told the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly that the PLO has told the international organization that the Palestinians will accept Israeli control over the Buraq Wall (Wailing or Western Wall).

Meanwhile, Israelis and Palestinians were waiting to receive a document from the White House intended to break the impasse in the peace process. The document is a "non-paper" (a non-binding diplomatic document) said to include a summary of points of agreement and disagreement at Camp David and later talks, with an eye to narrowing the wide gaps. Ziyad Abu ‘Amr, head of the Palestinian Legislative Council’s political committee, accused Washington on September 19 of being in the process of drafting a paper that would serve only to exert "pressure on us and blackmail and spoil the Palestinian position."

The Israeli daily Ha’aretz (September 21, 2000) provided a glimpse of what Washington has to offer in its bridging document. The paper stated that the position paper will put forward the principles of a framework agreement on the permanent status of the West Bank and the Ghazzah Strip, which could serve as a basis for three weeks of marathon talks between the two sides. The paper added that Washington had drawn up six or seven alternative scenarios to solve the problem of Jerusalem. It also disclosed that the Clinton administration was focusing on prodding the two sides into accepting a partial deal and postponing the thorniest issues.

Israel’s Channel Two television station reported on September 21 that the United States would suggest that the al-Haram al-Sharif compound should come under "international sovereignty." However, Israel’s acting foreign minister, Shlomo Ben Ami, was quick to point out that the American proposal did not envisage the transfer of sovereignty to the Security Council. In an interview with Israel Radio on September 21, Ben Ami confirmed that he had discussed with the Americans, the Egyptians, and the French the proposal that sovereignty over "Temple Mount" be transferred to the Security Council, but the Israelis had received no official proposal on the matter.

The welter of conflicting scenarios, bluffs and counter-bluffs, proposals and counter-proposals, seems to be based on a secret document drawn up in October 1995 between Yossi Beilin, then a top aide to then Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin (and now Israel’s justice minister), and Mahmoud ‘Abbas, commonly known by his nom de guerre of Abu Mazen, who is widely regarded as Arafat’s second-in-command in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Both men were instrumental in the secret "Oslo channel" that led to the Declaration of Principles signed at the White House on September 13, 1993.

Various summaries of the document, which Rabin did not sign before he was assassinated four days later, have been leaked to the press. But the Beilin-Abu Mazen plan was leaked in its entirety to Newsweek in mid-September after five years of secrecy. The leak was evidently designed to put pressure on somebody – the US, the Israelis, or the Palestinians – but who leaked it, and who the leak was aimed at, remains unclear.

The document, "Framework for the conclusion of a Final Status Agreement Between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization", envisages the creation of a "demilitarized" Palestinian state "with its capital al-Quds." At the same time, "the State of Palestine shall extend its recognition to the State of Israel – with its capital Yurushalayim." Regarding the al-Haram al-Sharif, the document states that: "The State of Palestine shall be granted extra-territorial sovereignty over the Haram ash-Sharif under the administration of the al-Quds Awqaf." This would put the compound under the effective sovereignty of Israel, giving it only a status reminiscent of an embassy, even though the al-Quds Awqaf would be charged with its administration.

The Beilin-Abu Mazen plan also agrees to Israel’s demand for a military presence and ‘early warning stations’ on the West Bank until May 2007. It also accepts Israel’s annexation of 4.5 percent of the West Bank. During the Camp David talks, Barak had suggested that Israel can annex blocs of settlements amounting to at least 10 percent of the area. On the question of the return of refugees, the Beilin-Abu Mazen Understanding limits the Palestinians’ right of return to the "State of Palestine." It accepts the return of a symbolic number of refugees to what is known as Israel proper, but cites"realities that have been created on the ground since 1948 [which] have rendered the implementation of this right [of return] impracticable."

Even if the two sides do succeed in reaching an agreement at this stage, however, there is no guarantee that the Barak government will live up to its commitments, or be able to get the Knesset to ratify it. Israel has refused to comply fully with the terms of the Oslo accords: withdrawals have been repeatedly deferred and delayed; stipulated schedules on the release of Palestinian prisoners have not been honoured, and agreed safe passages have not been completed.

Even assuming Barak’s sincerity, it is unlikely that he will be able to persuade the Knesset to ratify an agreement with the Palestinians. His cabinet has been hanging by a thread after losing its parliamentary majority in July, when right-wing and religious parties abandoned his Labour-led coalition in protest against his ‘peace’ policies. And even if the Knesset were to vote for an accord with the Palestinians, Barak has promised that it will not come into effect unless approved by a public referendum. Opinion polls in Israel suggest that such approval is virtually impossible.