Islamic Movement by Iqbal Siddiqui Although many contemporary Muslim states and governments claim Islamic legitimacy, directly or indirectly, Iran and Sudan are probably the only two states whose claims have been taken seriously by the Islamic movement at large. A possible third would be the ‘Emirate of Afghanistan’, but its case is somewhat different, for the Taliban have adopted a very narrow, nomocratic and backward-looking interpretation of Islam. The Islamic movements of Iran and Sudan in contrast, have grappled more directly with the challenge of building modern states and societies on Islamic principles. Iran and Sudan have had much in common in their experiences during recent years – Iran since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and Sudan since the military coup in 1989 which installed a regime led by general Omar al-Bashir and supported by the country’s Islamic movement, led by Shaikh Hasan al-Turabi. Notably, both have been subjected to intense pressure and attacks from the west, in the forms of military actions (direct and indirect), international isolation, economic and other sanctions, and other strategies. At the same time, both have also enjoyed the support of Muslims around the world. The Islamic Revolution in Iran has rightly been regarded as the catalyst for the resurgence of the global Islamic movement, of which the later developments in Sudan were a part. Imam Khomeini (r.a.) was widely recognised as de facto leader of the Ummah by Muslims all over the world, of all countries and schools of thought, and Islamic Iran continues to enjoy a unique standing among Muslims the world over. Sudan’s standing has also been significant, particularly among Islamic activists influenced by traditional Ikhwan al-Muslimoon and Jama’at-e Islami thinking, and those (particularly in the west) who have seen the urbane, western-educated Shaikh Turabi — with his easy references to democracy and civil society — as a less distant and demanding model of Islamic leadership. Sudan has also been seen by some as an Arab and Sunni Islamic state, the nationalist and sectarian issues raised in order to isolate Iran having had some effect even within the Islamic movement. Suggestions that Iran and Sudan are torn by internal conflict, and on the verge of collapse, have long been staples of western propaganda. However, both countries do have genuine debates and differences within their leaderships about the way forward. We need to understand these debates, their bases and the forms they have taken, in order to draw lessons from them. In Iran, the debate that the west is trying to present as a popular challenge to the Islamic state is in fact little more than an inevitable difference of opinion within the Islamic system. There are only a tiny number of so-called ‘reformers’ who actually wish to dismantle the system, and only a tiny number of ‘conservatives’ who make the mistake of regarding all those who support ‘reform’ to be enemies of the system. While there is the risk of a more serious polarisation, the fact that the Rahbar, Imam Sayyid Khamenei, and the president, Hujjatul-Islam Mohammad Khatami, regarded as leaders of the ‘conservative’ and ‘reform’ camps respectively, have excellent relations with each other and seem determined to share the middle ground, suggests that the west’s harping about a ‘power-struggle’ is little more than wishful thinking. The conflict in Sudan is rather more real, and the falling out between Shaikh Turabi and general Omar al-Bashir now appears final. Bashir’s freezing of National Congress (NC) structures and assets early last month (the NC being the Islamic movement led by Turabi), followed by Turabi’s dismissal of Bashir from the NC and declaration that his government is no longer a part of the Islamic movement, are the culmination of months of increasing tension. Bashir’s ‘coup’ against Turabi in December, when he dismissed the parliament that Turabi chaired and dominated, was followed five weeks later by a settlement that was never likely to last. Although Turabi’s aggressive response to Bashir’s latest attack has not been followed up by decisive action, leaving open the possibility of another settlement, this seems unlikely. Turabi may simply be biding his time, but his inaction may also reflect a realization that, whatever he does, the Islamic movement cannot soon regain its position in Sudan. Declaring all-out war on Bashir’s regime would damage both the movement and the government, leaving Sudan’s secular politicians, who have worked hard to fight Sudan’s Islamic regime, the only winners. Yet Turabi’s only alternatives are to reach yet another settlement with Bashir by which the movement will be reduced to little more than a legitimising crutch for Bashir’s military dictatorship, or to join the secular opposition as a unpopular junior member. Sitting tight and doing nothing is a common reaction when one is in a lose-lose situation. The difference between the Iranian and Sudanese situations reflects a fundamental difference in approach. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was a total revolution, by which the pre-revolutionary elites and institutions were largely dismantled, and power was transferred to totally new structures, based on the will of Iran’s people, and the leadership of muttaqi ulama. The development of new structures has inevitably been experimental and has progressed largely by trial and error. Nonetheless, the old order has been rooted out, and cannot raise its head again. Whatever Iran’s future, it will be shaped by, and based on, the Islamic political systems instituted by Iran’s Islamic movement following the Revolution. Shaikh Turabi’s understanding of ‘Islamic revolution’ has been rather different. Even the process by which the Islamic movement was brought into Bashir’s government remains unclear. At the time of Bashir’s coup, Turabi was placed in detention for six months, and then under house arrest. The Islamic movement only pledged its support for Bashir later, largely because of the latter’s commitment to ‘implement shari’ah’. The NC’s official version now is that Bashir was always a member of the Islamic movement and had been acting on Turabi’s instructions all along, and that Turabi’s detention had been a ploy to disguise the Islamic nature of Bashir’s takeover. What is clear, however, is that ultimate political power and authority in Sudan always lay with Bashir and the military, rather than with Turabi, the NC and the Islamic movement. In no way was the change of regime a total revolution in the sense that it was in Iran. And while the Islamic movement may have been brought into the power elite, it never exercised authority itself, whatever its members may have thought. That is not to say it did nothing: Turabi advocated gradual, social ‘Islamic revolution’, and instituted major changes in Sudanese society which were facilitated by Bashir’s government. But the fact remains that Islam was neither the basis of the state’s social authority, nor institutionalised in Sudanese society and state; there was always the likelihood that the interests and priorities of the state and the Islamic movement would diverge. This experience is by no means unprecedented. Islamic movement analysts compare it to the experience of the Ikhwan in Gamal Abdul Nasser’s takeover of power in Egypt in 1952; they were purged two years later. Another parallel is with the Jama’at-e Islami in Pakistan, which has repeatedly allied with secular political parties, and also lent its credibility to the military regime of general Zia-ul Haque, only to be repeatedly humiliated and totally discredited. It is hardly surprising that its credibility among Pakistan’s people is now virtually non-existent. Other Islamic groups also persist in advocating military coups as the best way of taking power, ignoring Iran’s demonstration of the power of the Muslim masses under a muttaqi leadership. The difference between Iran and Sudan can best be characterised as the difference between an Islamic State and an ‘Islamist’ government or regime. The former cannot easily be divorced from Islam, because Islamic principles are built into the system. The ‘Islamicity’ of the latter is far shallower and more easily undermined, although the regime’s leaders may be genuinely committed to Islam. Now, with Sudan’s Islamic experiment apparently over (although Bashir will no doubt continue to claim Islamic legitimacy), the reasons that many Islamic movement activists have long been lukewarm in their endorsement of Sudan’s Islamic regime should be clear. Islamic movements the world over must commit themselves to the hard task of total Islamic revolution, without looking for shortcuts or partners of expedience. That is the only way that genuine and secure Islamic states, like that in Iran, can be established, insha’Allah.Collapse of movement-military alliance in Sudan highlights the weaknesses of an ‘Islamic regime’
[Crescent International, June 1-15, 2000.]