Islamic Movement
Key aspects of the modus operandi of Lebanon’s Hizbullah-led Islamic Resistance
By Khalil Osman
[Crescent International, September 16-30, 2000.]
Amid the ecstatic jubilation of the recent victory of the Islamic resistance in Lebanon, questions surrounding Hizbullah’s organization and modus operandi have come to preoccupy those looking for ways to emulate its success in effecting a shift from the bitterness of occupation to the sweet joy of liberation. Hizbullah’s success provides a beacon of hope in the midst of total despair. For Hizbullah’s victory is like a flower that blossomed despite an atmosphere of intense pessimism engendered by the dark cloud of defeat hovering over the Arab world recently.
During its initial phases, the resistance against the Israeli occupation of parts of Lebanon took the form of small-scale and largely uncoordinated protests, strikes, boycotts of Israeli products, and homemade roadside bombs. It then developed into a well-organized resistance employing elements of classic guerrilla warfare, focusing mainly on booby-traps and hit-and-run attacks, as well as the novel "martyrdom-seeking" operations whereby fighters volunteer to drive vehicles packed with explosives into Israeli targets. The death-toll inflicted on Israeli soldiers forced the Israelis into a retreat from most of the south of Lebanon. On June 6, 1985, Israel completed its retreat to a self-declared "security zone" in the south of Lebanon, having previously occupied over half the country. This partial withdrawal strengthened the hand of Hizbullah, which had largely forced it.
In mid-1986, however, the Islamic Resistance reassessed its military efforts after losing 24 men in a single attack. The subsequent establishment of a naval unit was the beginning of a new stage in which the resistance combined elements of both conventional and guerrilla warfare. In general, the activities of the Islamic Resistance sought to overcome the enormous imbalance of power between itself and the enemy by striking at the zionists’ main weakness: that is their lack of will to endure protracted combat resulting in extensive human losses. Enemy convoys, encampments and fortifications were constantly targeted in a war of attrition, disturbing enemy formations, interrupting supply lines, and ultimately demoralizing both Israel’s troops and its society.
Every measure taken by the Israelis and their local militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), failed in the face of the determination of the resistance. Moreover, the resistance, which displayed remarkable creativity in finding new ways to engage the enemy, also succeeded in penetrating the SLA, gaining in the process useful information on the enemy’s movements. There is no doubt that accurate intelligence is important in every military confrontation.
The ensuing rise in the importance and popularity of Hizbullah did not come without a cost. For one thing, it raised Amal’s ire. Amal was worried that it might lose the south to its rival. This, along with Syria’s desire to curb the growth of Hizbullah, set the stage for armed clashes between Hizbullah and Amal that threatened to weaken the resistance by internecine fighting. However, Hizbullah’s leadership succeeded not only in avoiding all the traps, and in staying focused on the resistance, but also in forging an effective alliance and coordination with Damascus.
Coordination with Syria, the main power-broker in Lebanon, enabled Hizbullah to lean on the Lebanese government and demand its total support for the resistance. During the presidency of Amin Jumayyil (1982-88), Lebanese authorities embarked on a repressive campaign against the resistance, in which its fighters were harassed, arrested and tortured. In September 1993, the government of prime minister Rafiq Hariri ordered the army to open fire on a demonstration organized by Hizbullah to protest the signing of the Declaration of Principles; several protesters were killed and scores wounded. Had Hizbullah succumbed to the pressure to react in kind, the resistance could have been consumed in a whirlpool of internecine fighting. Instead, it understood that succumbing to this temptation would play into the hands of the main enemy.
The support of the Lebanese government, Iran and Syria was instrumental to victory. Aside from the diplomatic cover and international legitimacy it provided, this support facilitated the conduct of resistance activities. The Lebanese government’s support, for instance, allowed the resistance to maintain a media infrastructure and rear bases in areas under the government’s control, such as the southern suburbs of Beirut and the eastern Beqa’a Valley, and to move supplies, equipment and personnel freely in and out of the south.
Acutely aware of the complexity of Lebanese society as a polyglot mixture of seventeen sects, the Hizbullah-led Islamic resistance took pains to steer clear of sectarianism in any form, although its main source of manpower was the country’s Shi’i community. Its concentration on the common goal facilitated the emergence of a broad-based Lebanese national consensus around the cause of total liberation. Ennobling and morally transcending, the resistance therefore became a pillar of national unity and cohesion in a fractured social context that can well be described as a sectarian and political minefield.
Parallel to the growth in its military activities, Hizbullah developed a vast welfare system, complete with healthcare facilities, educational aid and institutions, and monetary assistance, geared toward the welfare of the poor and needy. Hizbullah’s welfare system benefited a great deal from the expertise and financial largesse of a host of Iranian revolutionary organizations, such as the Martyrs’ Foundation (Bunyad-e Shahid), the Foundation of the Oppressed (Bunyad-e Mustaz’afan), Imam Khomeini’s Relief Committee (Hay’at Imdad al-Imam al-Khomayni) and the Construction Jihad (Jihad-e Sazindagi). Its Islamic Health Committee (al-Hay’ah al-Suhhiyyah al-Islamiyyah) operates a multitude of hospitals and clinics throughout the country. Hizbullah’s welfare system also runs several orphanages and centers for the physically handicapped. It provides farmers with equipment, improved seed, livestock, training and advice, to start enterprises ranging from cultivating cash-crops to raising cattle, beehives and fish-farms. Families supported by Hizbullah’s welfare system receive a range of assistance, from food, household supplies and clothing to financial aid and scholarships. Hizbullah has also been involved in large-scale business operations, including real estate ventures and a chain of discount co-operative supermarkets.
Aside from being an expression of its genuine commitment to the well-being of the poor, Hizbullah’s welfare system had obvious benefits for the resistance. For one thing, it was instrumental in undermining the enemy’s strategy of striking civilian targets in order to terrorize people into pressurizing the resistance to cease its operations. These efforts also deepened the roots of Hizbullah in Lebanese society, thus making it increasingly difficult to undermine or obliterate its political role, influence or existence.
Now that the south has been liberated, pressure has been mounting on Hizbullah to become a political party, giving up its military activities and abandoning its firm stand on the liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem. During a meeting in June with a Jordanian delegation from the Association Against Zionism and Racism, Hizbullah secretary-general Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah revealed that Washington has actually offered to pay hundreds of millions of dollars, in the guise of aid to rebuild southern Lebanon, if Hizbullah reduces itself to a political party. Nasrallah assured the delegation that Hizbullah had no intention of giving up its traditional approach or its arms.
Even in the darkest hours of the occupation, Hizbullah’s leadership never considered the possibility of a compromise. All the attempts of Israel, its international supporters or defeatist "pragmatists" in the Arab world to lure Hizbullah into a shady deal with the enemy or an implicit recognition of Israel were in vain. They are hardly likely to change their approach now.
The decisive victory of Hizbullah has implications far beyond Lebanon. Hizbullah has radically recast the boundaries of political discourse in the Arab world. It has made possible the return of the rhetoric and logic of resistance into Arab political discourse – elements that have been largely suppressed since the hallucinogenic haze of the "peace process" descended on the region. The recovery of the discourse of resistance helps prune a dense web of defeatist assumptions that masqueraded as pragmatism and realism. The essential questions at issue in this discourse will from now on turn not on the possibility of rolling back and defeating the zionist occupation, but rather on the means, tactics and strategies that need to be employed in order to ensure victory. This does not augur well for Israel, which will soon realize that it has not seen the last of the Hizbullah-inspired resistance movement.