Inauguration of Iran’s majlis heralds a new phase of the Islamic Revolution
By Zafar Bangash
[Crescent International, June 16-30, 2000.]
With the inauguration of Iran’s new majlis (parliament) on May 27, the Islamic Republic of Iran has entered a new phase of its political life. Twenty-one years after the victory of the Islamic revolution, Iran has matured politically and is ready to move to the next stage, although there is a feeling in some quarters that this is being done at the expense of its Islamic revolutionary credentials. A revolution establishes its own standards which become its normal state. An abiding legacy of the Islamic Revolution is its fierce independence and exposure of the west, especially the US, as the enemy of Islam.
In his message to the new majlis, the Rahbar, Ayatullah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, reminded the deputies to frustrate enemy propaganda by demonstrating that this parliament is, like its predecessors, in the service of Islam. His reference was to the incessant western propaganda depicting a majority of the newly-elected deputies as being opposed to the Islamic system of government. While the west will once again be frustrated in its evil designs, it is important for the new majlis to demonstrate its commitment openly so that it leaves no one in any doubt.
In the ongoing debate in Iran, several issues have emerged. The first and foremost is the role of civil society in an Islamic state. This has been a constant theme of president Mohammed Khatami’s since his election three years ago. Two other issues have also emerged: the nature of dissent and relations with the US. The first is related to the concept of civil society itself: how much space must be provided for dissent, and in what form? Similarly, relations with the US have been debated vigorously from every conceivable perspective. The immediate task facing president Khatami and his government, however, is revival of the economy. Iran is not a poor country; it earns billions in oil revenues annually. With increased oil prices, this will help Iran overcome some of its immediate difficulties. Yet there is also a growing problem undermining public confidence: corruption. This scourge has to be confronted head-on in order to restore confidence and revive economic activity. Although no society can be completely corruption-free, in an Islamic state it comes as a double blow. The Islamic state, by definition, is a moral state based on the rule of law. There can be no room in it for corruption. Those who have indulged in or are indulging in corruption have to be rooted out completely and punished.
There is a body of opinion which suggests that the economy will only improve significantly when Iran’s relations with the US are restored. This argument is based on a false premise and stems from a faulty perception of the west in general and the US in particular. As a self-proclaimed superpower, the US has a pathological hatred of Islam. If Iran wishes to maintain its Islamic identity — and there is no doubt that it does since this is something its leadership and people have repeatedly affirmed — then there can be no normality of relations with the US to which Tehran can return. The two are at opposite poles. This point unfortunately is not clearly understood by some in Iran. They hold the simplistic belief that if the US promises to behave, then it will do so. American promises of good behaviour must be taken with a large pinch of salt.
Even if the US government promises to behave itself, there are other avenues through which it is able to undermine target societies. Western culture is seductive and hedonistic; it sweeps all in its wake. Even such traditional societies as the Chinese and Japanese have succumbed to western pop music and American hamburgers-and-jeans culture. This unfortunately is now being witnessed in some parts of Tehran as well, especially among the children of the wealthy. This class of people have made no sacrifices for the Revolution, nor played any role in the defence of the Islamic state, but want all the perks of life to the exclusion of the downtrodden. It would be a mistake to play up to this constituency of western-doting parasites.
This does not mean that the Islamic government should pursue an exclusionary policy. Instead, it must concentrate on including those who have made tremendous sacrifices for the Revolution. One of the problems that has emerged in the increasingly loud debate among what are erroneously called the "moderates" and "conservatives" is the suspicion with which they view each other. True, among the so-called moderate camp there is a small minority which is opposed to the Islamic system of government, but it would be wrong to assume that everyone supporting president Khatami holds such views. Similarly, it is wrong for the "moderates" to assume that the "conservatives" must stop suspecting US motives and that Iran has matured enough to be able to deal with Uncle Sam on an equal footing. The Imam’s description of the US as the "great satan" is as valid today as when these profound words were first uttered more than 20 years ago. In fact, the conservatives’ resistance to western influence has helped to stem the tide of vulgar western culture that might otherwise have infected all strata of Iranian society. Islamic Iran must not become another Pakistan or Saudi Arabia.
To his credit, president Khatami has made great efforts to win the trust and confidence of the Rahbar. He has also given the kind of respect that is due to the Rahbar as leader of the Islamic Revolution. The same degree of respect must be shown by the other members of his broad coalition as well. There is no doubt that within this coalition there are different strands of opinion, ranging from the liberals to the downright secularists. Islamic Iran cannot afford to have anymore Bani Sadrs or Qutbzadehs. President Khatami must ensure that such tendencies do not emerge among his followers. If there are any such elements, he must root them out.
There is also the issue of press freedom. An Islamic state is an ideological state. No state, whatever its ideology, tolerates attacks on its very foundations and fundamental principles. This is not permitted even in the US, where freedom is touted as one of its guiding principles. One only has to look at the manner in which protesters were beaten up in Seattle last October during the World Trade Organisation meeting and again in Washington in April when the IMF/World Bank meeting was taking place. The viciousness with which peaceful protesters were beaten up and mauled is a telling reflection of the degree to which dissent is tolerated in the so-called free societies of the west. Anyone in Iran who harbours the notion that they have absolute freedom, that they can write whatever they like and attack anyone they like, had better think again. The Islamic state cannot and must not permit assault on its cherished values and principles. Individual freedom cannot take precedence over the collective well-being of society. Unfortunately, some segments of the media in Iran have failed to realise their true responsibility.
The Islamic state, however, must define the space in which dissenting views are allowed an expression. One is reminded of Imam Ali’s advice to his supporters. When a group of people threatened to kill him, he told his followers to let them be. He said that as long as they do not attempt to carry out their threat, they should not be harmed. Such degree of tolerance is worth bearing in mind in Iran, with the caveat that today a dissenting group may not necessarily be operating independently of outside influences or links. It must be understood that attacks on the concept of velayat-e faqih are essentially aimed at doing away with the Islamic system of government. The Vali-e Faqih is a fundamental pillar of the Islamic state. It is not surprising that the really conservative elements and the true secularists of Iranian society are as one in their opposition to the role of the Vali-e Faqih. This strange alliance is essentially aimed at undermining the Islamic system of government, each group viewing the situation from its own end of the tunnel. There is, of course, an overwhelming majority between who are solidly supportive not only of the Islamic system but also of the Vali-e Faqih personally.
What the new majlis in Iran, therefore, needs to do is to strengthen president Khatami’s hand to revive the economy. The immense potential of Iran needs to be realised with the same zeal as was witnessed in defence of the Islamic Revolution when faced with external aggression. There is no room in this for politicking. The Islamic state must remain above such considerations.