September 16-30, 2000 / Lebanon

Hizbullah-Amal successes better news for Lebanon than possible return of Hariri

By Khalil Osman
[Crescent International, September 16-30, 2000.]

The electoral dust is settling in Lebanon after the second and final stage of the parliamentary election on September 3, and a clear picture of the new parliament is emerging. Lists formed or supported by former prime minister Rafik al-Hariri swept the capital, whereas the alliance of erstwhile Shi’i rival groups Amal and Hizbullah swept the south and the eastern Beqa’a Valley.

Sixty-five new deputies were elected in the second stage of the elections, which covered Beirut, the eastern Beqa’a and the south; 63 others had already been elected in Mount Lebanon and the north in the first stage of elections on August 27. The voting was characterized by honesty and neutrality of the government, in marked contrast to the conduct of the 1996 elections during Hariri’s premiership, which were marred by signs of ballot-stuffing, vote-buying and other electoral chicanery.

In the south, the alliance of Amal and Hizbullah achieved total victory. The alliance also won all 9 seats in the Ba’albak-Hermel electoral district in the Beqa’a. Hizbullah scooped all the 12 seats that its candidates contested in the elections, up from nine seats in the previous legislature. The 23-member ticket led by Amal leader Nabih Berri, the incumbent speaker of parliament, swept the south. Notably, Hizbullah candidates on the Berri-led list secured more votes than the Amal candidates, reflecting the popularity of Hizbullah in the liberated south. Even voters in the Christian town of Marj’ayun and the nearby villages of Dibil, ‘Ayn Ibil, and Rmeish, where Israel’s proxy militia, the ‘South Lebanon Army’, maintained a solid presence during the occupation, voted overwhelmingly for Hizbullah candidates.

During the electoral campaign, observers, politicians and analysts argued that the alliance between Amal and Hizbullah had been forged for electoral expediency. Some suggested that the alliance would last little longer than the elections. However, after the polls, leaders of both groups asserted that their alliance would continue. In a press conference held on September 6, Berri said that the Amal-Hizbullah alliance will continue in the new chamber as a "political coalition." He also raised the possibility of merging his Resistance and Development parliamentary bloc with Hizbullah’s 12-strong Loyalty to the Resistance bloc.

In Beirut, Hariri won against incumbent prime minister Dr. Salim al-Hoss, who became the first serving prime minister in the country’s modern history to be defeated at the ballot box. Three tickets formed by Hariri won 18 out of the 19 seats contested in the capital. The 19th seat went to Hizbullah candidate Muhammad al-Birjawi. Hariri and his supporters scooped a total of 24 seats. Together with his allies, led by Druze leader Walid Jumblat, who won 16 seats, he can be expected to assemble a large bloc in the 128-seat chamber.

The new parliament will be sworn in on October 17. In accordance with the constitution, the incumbent cabinet must resign as soon as the new parliament is convened. The president will then start consultations on the formation of a new government.

The former prime minister fought a fierce media campaign, in which virulent venom was exchanged between outlets of his media empire — whose backbone is comprised of Future TV and the Al-Mustaqbal daily — and the state-run media. His overwhelming success in the capital gave way to predictions that he would return to the premiership which he quit in 1998 amid differences with newly-elected president Emile Lahoud.

But predictions of Hariri’s return to power were dampened by doubts cast from a number of quarters. Speaking to journalists on September 6, Hizbullah’s deputy secretary-general Shaykh Na’im Qassim said: "The choice of prime minister need not be dictated by the results of the elections." He added that such a choice "is the outcome of a mechanism that can give a result completely different from the forecasts. Things may change in the next six weeks."

Even Hariri sounded cautious about the prospects of his return to the premiership. Speaking to journalists on September 5, he said that talk of a return to office was "premature." Berri has also described speculation about Hariri as premature.

The possibility does not augur well for the ailing Lebanese economy. Hariri’s tenure as prime minister between 1992 and 1998 was characterized by widespread corruption, nepotism and waste of public funds. Instead of securing any form of growth, his economic policies were largely an edifice of monopoly and sleaze that enriched him and his coterie of allies and toadies, smothered business, and saddled the country with a colossal debt of US$20 billion. His "white elephant" post-war reconstruction project was not only imbalanced, focusing too much on Beirut, but also became the symbol of his attempt to take over the Lebanese economy. The reorganization of government bureaucracy, the heart of Hariri’s so-called administrative reform measures, was not a model of meritocracy but merely a reshuffling of bureaus and an attempt to distribute the spoils of public office to sycophants, supporters and allies. In addition, restricting freedoms and one-upmanship were the mainstays of his domestic policies. In politics, Hariri, who built a business empire based on absolute power over his employees, displayed a marked aversion to public scrutiny.

If Hariri returns to power, all this could happen again. At a press conference on September 5, Hariri said that austerity and debt reduction were not the answer to Lebanon’s economic woes. He insisted that rejuvenating the sickly economy would be achieved through a "trickledown" approach aimed at raising the gross domestic product. Yet absent from Hariri’s vision of economic recovery are policies aimed at an equitable distribution of wealth. Hariri’s vision of recovery remains one of reckless and unbounded borrowing, one in which empty promises are used to fool the public, and where the rich, the well-connected and the powerful profit from ‘reform’, while the poor suffer the dislocations of economic restructuring.

Hariri’s resounding electoral victory underlines the perils of political money. Prime minister Hoss rightly warned after his electoral defeat that: "Freedom in Lebanon is being taken hostage by political money." Likewise, interior minister Michel al-Murr decried the negative impact left by "money and the media" on the polls, saying: "There is no doubt that money and the media impair democracy." In a country like Lebanon, with few legal controls on the use of money and the media in political campaigns, wealth can help its holders obtain more than undue influence. It can also win them public office.

Hariri, a naturalized Saudi tycoon with close ties to the kingdom’s royal family, staged his debut on the Lebanese political scene some 20 years ago through a number of seemingly philanthropic projects. Until the late 1980s, Hariri repeatedly asserted that he had no political ambitions and that his philanthropic activities were merely an expression of altruism. But when he entered the Lebanese political game in the early 1990s, he did so with an unabashed, lustful passion for power.

The Hariri-Jumblat and Amal-Hizbullah blocs are going to be the largest blocs in the new parliament. As neither bloc has an absolute majority, minor blocs and independents are likely to exert significant influence on the balance of power in the legislature by forging occasional alliances around specific issues and topics.

The emerging consensus in the country is in favour of a government of "politicians" rather than one of "technocrats" like the Hoss cabinet. Shaykh Qassim told reporters at his news conference: "It seems that the lack of politicians has made the government susceptible to many things because the country’s make-up is delicate and requires politicians; but Hizbullah wants qualified politicians." Speaker Berri called for a government of national unity capable of adopting "painful and unpopular measures" needed to tackle the economy.

But Lebanon’s history casts doubts on the ability of a government of politicians to take the country up to the sunny uplands of prosperity and national harmony. A government of national unity, bringing together representatives of major Christian and Muslim groups, was formed at the end of the civil war in 1990. It was characterized by incessant bickering and petty squabbles.

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